偏见专家证人:R诉Thomas 爱迪生

新不伦瑞克大学凯特·吉根斯(Kate Jurgens)

2015年,新不伦瑞克省女王法院开庭审理了 诉爱迪生 在此期间,官方专家证人的独立性和公正性受到质疑。[一世] 辩方试图以专家有偏见为由排除证据。该评论概述了加拿大判例法中专家证据可采性的概况,尤其是考虑到 诉爱迪生 and 白朗吉, 最高法院最近的一项判决与先前的判例不同。

从那以后 莫汉 关于偏见在专家证据可采性中的作用,下级法院之间存在很多分歧。[ii] An examination of the jurisprudence reveals that two schools of thought have developed. The first views independence 和 impartiality as a stand-alone criterion that must be met as a threshold requirement in order to have 专家 evidence admitted. This view is reflective of the traditional categorical approach, which lacks flexibility but has the benefit of providing structure 和 predictability to the law. The second considers independence 和 impartiality to be a matter 地址ed under judicial discretion to assess the probative value of the evidence in relation to its prejudicial effect. This view is representative of the principled approach, which offers more flexibility but lacks predictability. Ferguson J in 爱迪生 stressed the latter approach as a means to 地址 the independence 和 impartiality of 专家 见证人es, ultimately holding that a trial judge should consider the weight that independence 和 impartiality holds when balancing its prejudicial effect against the probative value of the 见证.

的真实价值 爱迪生 弗格森大法官对司法自由裁量权在确保专家证人独立公正方面的作用进行了分析。 爱迪生 通过扩大对专家证据的司法自由裁量权的作用,增加了加拿大判例法,并在此过程中将证据法进一步朝着有原则的方法发展。中的决定 爱迪生 说明了从严格的基于规则的方法向灵活的原则方法的转变。而 莫汉 仍然很突出 爱迪生 指出法官拥有的剩余权力应作为确定专家证据的独立性和公正性的分析重点,从而扩展了司法自由裁量权的作用。这种转变允许采用情境方法,从而将被告享有公正审判的权利置于分析的最前沿。

在接下来的几个月 爱迪生 the Supreme Court 地址ed this very issue in Burgess Langille Inman v 雅培和哈利伯顿 [白朗格]。 [iii] The Court held that an 专家 must acknowledge that their primary duty is to provide unbiased evidence to the court. This effectively creates a threshold requirement which the 专家 must meet in order for their 见证 to be admissible. This decision does not conform to the general trend seen in recent years 和 is more characteristic of the categorical approach in which admissibility was 地址ed as a threshold matter, rather than as an exercise of judicial discretion.

随着时间的流逝,有关专家证据可采性的判例表明,从分类方法向着重于灵活性和个案分析的原则方法明显偏离。 爱迪生 这是证据法领域的重要贡献,因为它朝着有原则的方法不断发展,认为当质疑专家的独立性和公正性时,分析的重点应放在司法自由裁量权上。 爱迪生 以先前的法学为基础,但是 白朗格 打破了这种趋势,两者似乎是不可调和的。 爱迪生 是现代原则方法的代表,在现代方法中,司法自由裁量权被用来平衡证明价值与证据的偏见效力,而 白朗格 应用分类分析,其中将阈值要求添加到 莫汉 测试是否被接受。

在最高法院最近的判决之前  白朗格 下级法院密切关注 莫汉 test,爱迪生 代表了这一趋势。这些矛盾的决定表明未来几年将发生重大变化。 爱迪生 当人们质疑独立性和公正性时,这似乎是扩大司法自由裁量权的灯塔。鉴于 白朗格 好像 爱迪生 现在将做出不同的决定。

[一世] 诉托马斯·爱迪生 [2015] NBQB 074号

[ii] R·莫汉 [1995] 2 SCR 9

[iii] White Burgess Langille Inman v 雅培和哈利伯顿 [2015] 2 S.C.R. 182

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